Limitations on Creditors\u27 Practices and Remedies under the UCCC by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1970
Limitations on Creditors' Practices and Remedies
under the UCCC
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Limitations on Creditors' Practices and Remedies under the UCCC" (1970). Minnesota Law Review.
2981.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2981
Limitations on Creditors' Practices
and Remedies Under ihe UCCC
I. INTRODUCTION
This section of the Consumer Credit Symposium considers
specific practices of creditors in transactions with consumers.
In particular, it will outline provisions common to consumer
credit contracts, consider their appropriateness in consumer
transactions and compare their present treatment in Minnesota
with their treatment under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code'
in order to evaluate the degree of protection afforded consumers.
Various remedies available to creditors upon default by a con-
sumer will then be analyzed to illustrate how present regulation
would be affected by adoption of the UCCC. Where applicable,
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act2 and the Uniform
Commercial Code3 will be considered. 4
It must be kept in mind that the Code provisions are appli-
cable only in transactions involving consumers, specifically, con-
sumer credit sales, consumer leases and consumer loans.5 Since
many of the existing collection laws, contractual provisions and
other creditors' remedies that the Code attempts to regulate were
developed long before consumer credit became widespread, their
present inappropriateness is not surprising.0 Equality of bar-
1. Official Text with Comments (1969) [hereinafter cited as
UCCC].
2. 82 Stat. 146, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (Supp. IV, 1968) [herein-
after cited as FCCPA]. Section 1633 exempts credit transactions where
state regulation is "substantially similar."
3. Enacted in Minnesota as MiNN. STAT. § 336 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as UCC].
4. See generally Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-
Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 686 (1968); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit
Regulations: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445
(1968); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1969); Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 24
Bus. LAW. 183 (1968).
5. UCCC § 2.104 defines consumer credit sale; UCCC § 2.106 de-
fines consumer lease, and UCCC § 3.104 defines consumer loan. Con-
sumer credit transactions "primarily for an agricultural purpose" are
specifically excluded from UCCC §§ 2.403, .404A, .404B, .405, .409 & 3.402,
and will not be discussed in this Note.
6. It would have been an astonishing coincidence if the
nineteenth century system of collection laws-garnishment,
wage assignments, deficiency judgments, default judgments,
repossessions, and so forth-which was conceived long before
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gaining power and freedom of contract characterize the typical
commercial transaction and underlie both traditional creditor
practices and many provisions of the UCC.7 These concepts,
however, do not accurately describe the typical consumer credit
transaction which is instead characterized by "disparity in bar-
gaining power between the two parties ... coupled with the
average consumer's almost total lack of understanding of the le-
gal implications of the transaction."8 It is not unnatural, there-
fore, for the creditor to continue using traditional practices, par-
ticularly when they operate to his advantage.0 In addition, the
consumer credit industry strongly encourages credit purchases
with little or no consideration of the individual consumer's total
indebtedness or general financial condition.10 In light of the ad-
vantages that traditional commercial practices afford the creditor
and the increasing volume of consumer credit transactions, self-
regulation seems unlikely. The UCCC offers the alternative of
comprehensive and uniform regulation by the state.
II. MAKING THE AGREEMENT: PROVISIONS
CORRELATING EFFECTIVE RATE AND
DISCLOSURE REGULATION
In order to offset the present advantages enjoyed by credi-
tors, consumer-oriented legislation" strictly limits the use of
many traditional creditor practices in making a consumer-credit
agreement. For example, the UCCC correlates its regulation of
the consumer entered the credit arena, had been found appro-
priate in the hard-sell, easy-credit mass consumer market of
the latter third of the twentieth century. These creditors'
remedies are the product of an age when easy credit terms were
not available, and community attitudes toward use of credit
were strict, credit was reluctantly extended and warily ac-
cepted. Credit transactions were entered into with somewhat
more equality of bargaining power and economic sophistication
than is the case today, for the lower economic groups were not
yet important participants in the credit market.
Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 433.
7. Id. See also Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment
Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Mxcn. L. REv.
1465, 1472 (1966). "Traditionalists at heart, the Code does not seem to
deny the basic-premise that what a written contract signed by the
parties says is the private law of the parties." Id.
8. Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation. A Canadian Consumer-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLM.. L. REv. 488, 490 (1968).
9. "A second factor in the need for comprehensive legislation is
the natural tendency of business to follow the line of least resistance
and its well documented inability to police itself." Id. at 491.
10. Id. at 492.
11. E.g., 1969 National Consumer Act (First Final Draft 1969).
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rates and disclosure with regulation of the actual credit agree-
ment including form of payment, additional charges and notice
requirements, plus strict supervision of particular types of credit
sales. The interrelation of these provisions favors compre-
hensive and uniform legislation rather than the continuing
stream of piecemeal measures.
A. FORM OF PAYMENT
1. Multiple Agreements
Multiple agreements are a form of payment available for use
in credit agreements even though potentially inconsistent with
regulation of rates and disclosure. A graduated system of in-
terest rate ceilings, like that in the UCCC,12 provides a creditor
with great incentive for dividing a single sale or loan into two
or more agreements without informing the debtor of the true
purpose. As explained in the UCCC's comment to section 2.402,
the highest rates are allowed
on amounts financed up to $300 and the next highest rates on
amounts financed up to $1,000. In order to achieve maximum
rates, a seller might arbitrarily divide a sale into two or more
agreements in order that the amount financed under each is
within the $300 amount on which the highest rate can be
charged.
The UCCC's exemption from disclosure of annual percentage
rates for minimum charges' 3 offers another possible impetus for
using multiple agreements. An unsophisticated consumer may
thus enter into the agreement unaware of what he must actu-
ally pay or of the fact he is paying more than the ordinary in-
terest charge. To avoid this situation, the UCCC forbids such
"9multiple agreements.' u 4  On the other hand, Minnesota state
law imposes no limitation on multiple agreements; therefore,
only the FCCPA provides protection in Minnesota's to the extent
that "[a] creditor may not divide a consumer credit sale into two
12. UCCC §§ 2.201 & 3.508. See notes 35-42 and accompanying
text in Note, Rate Regulation Under the UCCC, 55 MiNN. L. REv. 525
(1971).
13. UCCC § 2.306(2) (k). "The seller shall give to the buyer the
following information: . . . (k) rate of the credit service charge ... ex-
cept in the case of a credit service charge which does not exceed $5
when the amount financed does not exceed $75 or $7.50 when the
amount financed exceeds $75 . .. ."
14. UCCC §§ 2.402 & 3.402. There is no mention of consumer
leases since such a provision would be irrelevant.
15. FCCPA operates unless state legislation is submitted and
found to be "substantially similar." See note 2 supra.
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or more sales to avoid the disclosure of an annual percentage
rate .... ,,16 Since the FCCPA is explicitly directed only at dis-
closure, a multiple agreement that sufficiently discloses the an-
nual percentage rate may be acceptable even though it avoids
the state's system of interest rate ceilings.
2. Balloon. Payments
Contracts containing a series of small installment payments
followed by a very large final, or "balloon," payment are com-
mon in credit arrangements with consumers. The consumer may
be induced to enter into the credit agreement by the seemingly
manageable size of the installment payments with little or no
notice of the final payment, thus frustrating the purposes of dis-
closure. At the end of the contract, the debtor may be unpre-
pared to meet the often unexpected balloon payment and thus
be forced to default.17 The UCCC gives the consumer the right
to refinance without penalty any credit sale or loan payment that
is "more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled
payments.' 8
The UCCC also restricts balloon payments in consumer
leases by stating, "[t] he obligation of a lessee upon expiration of
a consumer lease ... may not exceed twice the average payment
allocable to a monthly period under the lease." 19 As suggested
by the UCCC's comment, 20 this section protects against an addi-
tional abuse available in consumer leases-the "open end" lease.
Under such an agreement, the parties contract that at the ex-
piration of the lease the article leased, usually an automobile,
will have a certain depreciated value and will be sold. If it
brings less than the agreed depreciated value, the lessee is liable
for the difference; if it brings more, the lessee is entitled to the
surplus. 21
Such a practice violates the purposes of disclosure because the
consumer may not know how much the lease will actually cost
him, and also "if the lessor sets an unrealistically high depre-
ciated value the contingent liability of the lessee will increase
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (a) (7) (Supp. V, 1969). See also 34 Fed. Reg.
2002 (1969), as amended 34 Fed. Reg. 5326, 13410, 18242 (1969).
17. Ruona v: Freeway Dodge, 285 Minn. 23, 171 N.W.2d 212 (1969),
provides an example of a balloon payment. See text accompanying
note 26 infra. The harshness of such contract provisions is often com-
pounded by the broad range of remedies available to creditors on de-
fault by the debtor. See Part I of this Note.
18. UCCC §§ 2.405 & 3.402.
19. UCCC § 2.406.
20. Id., Comment.
21. Id.
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accordingly, and the seller can offer deceptively low rental pay-
ments to a gullible customer.
'22
Presently, Minnesota's only statutory regulation of balloon
payments is found in the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales
Act,23 which requires that unequal or irregular payments fall
within the time-price differential. 24 The Motor Vehicle Act es-
tablishes a table of allowable interest rate differentials depend-
ing upon the period of time over which payments are spread.
25
The ineffectiveness of this restriction was recently shown in
Ruona v. Freeway Dodge.26 The Minnesota Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether a final installment payment of
$1,527.84, following 35 monthly payments of $80.00 each, was
within the allowable time-price differential. In upholding the
credit arrangement, the court reasoned that because such a large
amount of the contract price was to be paid at the end, the con-
sumer had the use of a greater amount of money for a longer
time and thus the allowable effective rate of interest was higher
than if the payments had been equal. Seeking to justify its de-
cision, the court stated:
This interpretation, in our opinion, is consistent not only with
the express terms of the act, but also with its basic purpose of
consumer protection and of stabilization of the finance industry.
While the "effective rate" of 19.57 percent permitted on plain-
tiff's contract seems quite high, it is for the legislature and not
for this court to strike the balance between protecting the con-
sumer and permitting legitimate finance companies to earn a
profitable return on high risk used-car installment sale con-
tracts.27
With respect to the FCCPA, Regulation Z28 requires that, "if
any payment is more than twice the amount of an otherwise regu-
larly scheduled equal payment, the creditor shall identify the
amount of such payment by the term 'balloon payment' .... 1,29
Thus, in Ruona, the final payment would not have been included
in determining if it were a balloon payment and disclosure would
have been required. The UCCC also requires disclosure and ex-
cludes the final payment in its determination. But the UCCC goes
22. Id.
23. MIN. STAT. §§ 168.66-.77 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Motor
Vehicle Act].
24. MnN. STAT. § 168.72(c) & (a) (1969). See Note, supra note
12, at 533 & n. 65.
25. Id.
26. 285 Minn. 23, 171 N.W.2d 212 (1969).
27. Id. at 31-32, 171 N.W.2d at 217-18 (emphasis added).
28. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.12 (1970).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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further than the FCCPA to permit refinancing.30
B. ADDMiONAL CHARGES
Not uncommon in consumer credit contracts are provisions
for additional charges upon late payment or nonpayment of an
installment Such charges are often excessive and unexpected
by the consumer and thus contrary to the purpose of the disclo-
sure regulations. Also a major purpose of rate regulation is to
protect the consumer debtor from hidden charges which in ef-
fect increase the rate of interest.
1. Attorneys' Fees
One type of additional charge is a provision in the contract
which places the expense of attorneys' fees incurred in the col-
lection of the debt upon the defaulting debtor. The UCCC pro-
vides two alternative treatments of this charge. Alternative A3'
prohibits a provision for attorneys' fees in a consumer purchase
or loan contract on the theory that such collection costs are part
of business overhead.3 2 Considering the widespread use of col-
lection agencies, the continuing relationship most sellers and
lenders have with attorneys, the predictability of a certain per-
centage of late payments or nonpayments and the inability of
many defaulters to pay anything, such an approach seems realis-
tic. 33 On the other hand, the cost of credit may rise and, more im-
portant, the credit market may tighten in an attempt by credi-
tors to avoid as many defaulting debtors as possible. In these
circumstances it is the poor who would suffer most and for whom
the approach of Alternative A may be inadequate.
Alternative B illustrates the more common theory that at-
torneys' fees ought to be borne-at least in part-by the default-
30. UCCC §§ 2.405 & 3.402. See notes 19-23 supra and accom-
panying text.
31. UCCC §§ 2.413A & 3.404A. See also UCCC § 3.514 for a
similar treatment of loans under $1,000.
32. Id. § 2.413A, Comment.
33. Kripke, supra note 4, at 29. In support of Alternative A, one
commentator has stated:
This provision recognizes the striking braking effect the pres-
ence of such a clause has when the debtor is either unable or
unwilling to pay. Even when the debtor has an honest belief
that he has a right to refuse to pay, the potential additional
liability for a substantial lawyer's fee makes him hesitant to
assert his claim. When the debtor is unable to pay, the
added liability simply adds to the burdens of his insolvency or
forces him to divert funds from necessities.
Hogan, supra note 4, at 704.
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ing buyer who causes the seller to incur the expense.3 4 Al-
though the UCCC as proposed to Minnesota's legislature in 1969
contained Alternative A,35 Alternative B3 6 is very similar to the
treatment of attorneys' fees in Minnesota's Motor Vehicle Act.
The Motor Vehicle Act provides a maximum allowance for attor-
neys' fees of "15% of the amount due and payable under such
contract . . ." and requires "... an attorney not a salaried em-
ployee of the holder of the contract . . . ."' Both Alternative
B and the Motor Vehicle Act eliminate the most blatant abuses
of a contract provision for attorneys' fees.
Besides the Motor Vehicle Act, Minnesota has enacted the
Uniform Commercial Code which provides that upon default in a
secured transaction, the secured party may sell the collateral and
apply the proceeds to "reasonable attorney's fees and legal ex-
penses incurred by the secured party .... 38 Although the UCC
applies only to secured sales and loans, these are common in
consumer transactions. Consequently, the lack of any provision
establishing a maximum for attorneys' fees may work a harsh re-
sult upon the consumer in a secured transaction, since even rea-
sonable attorneys' fees may be high.
Thus, other than the maximum established in the Motor Ve-
hicle Act, Minnesota leaves the question of attorneys' fees un-
regulated. Alternative B provides some relief by extending the
15 percent maximum beyond motor vehicle sales whereas alter-
native A provides much greater relief by placing the total burden
on the creditor who can more easily prepare for default. The
present possibility of an excessive and unexpected charge for at-
torneys' fees illustrates the need for comprehensive limitations
and the UCCC appears to offer feasible alternatives.
2. Default Charges
Attorneys' fees are only one type of additional charge avail-
34. See UCCC § 2.413B, Comment. Compare UCCC § 5.202(8)
which allows the court to include attorneys' fees in the debtor's award
when the creditor is found to have violated the UCCC. See Rice,
Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transaction Problems, 48 BosT. U.L. Rsv. 559, 570-76 (1968).
35. J. of the House 10-105, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day).
36. UCCC §§ 2.413B & 3.404B.
37. MINN. STAT. § 168.71 (a) (3) (1969). See also UCCC §§ 2.413B &
3.404B which require a non-salaried attorney as well as limiting the
charge to "15 percent of the unpaid debt after default .... " This
UCCC language more clearly specifies that the amount paid is sub-
tracted before the fee is computed.
38. UCC § 9-504(1) (a) (1962 Official Text).
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able to creditors upon default. Default charges are used by
creditors to conceal certain costs and are thus inconsistent with
rate and disclosure regulation. Except for specified delinquency
charges, 39 the cost of realizing on collateral 40 and attorneys'
fees,41 the UCCC prohibits default charges, making such a provi-
sion in a consumer credit contract unenforceable.4 2
Minnesota takes a similar approach in the Motor Vehicle Act
where " [t] he holder of a retail installment contract may, if the
contract so provides, collect a delinquency and collection charge
on each installment in arrears for a period not less than ten days
in an amount not in excess of five percent of each installment or
$5, whichever is less. '43 Minnesota's Bank Installment Loan Act
also allows limited delinquency charges, but unlike the UCCC
and the Motor Vehicle Act, does not regulate attorneys' fees. 4
Thus, allowable additional charges are specified in two major
areas of consumer credit, but other credit sales and non-bank
loans remain subject to unlimited default charges. The UCCC
would uniformly apply to all transactions involving consumers
and thus eliminate the present deficiencies in Minnesota law.
C. RIGHT OF NoTicE
1. Notice of Assignment
The notice of assignment provision appearing in both the
credit sales and the loans sections of the UCCC4 5 is derived from
a very similar section of the UCC.46 The notice provision pro-
tects the account debtor from incurring liability for late pay-
ment or nonpayment when he mistakenly pays his original
creditor after an assignment of the account has been made. Un-
til the account debtor receives notice reasonably identifying the
rights assigned, he is authorized to pay his original seller, lessor
39. UCCC § 2.203.
40. UCC § 9-504 (1962 Official Text).
41. UCCC §§ 2.413B & 3.404B. Alternative A prohibits a provi-
sion for the payment by debtor of attorneys' fees. See text accompany-
ing notes 28-36 supra. UCCC § 3.514 does the same as Alternative
A when a consumer loan is under $1,000.
42. UCCC §§ 2.414 & 3.405. Leases are not covered.
43. !MiT. STAT. § 168.71(a)(3) (1969). UCCC § 2.203(1) is the
same.
44. MmNi. STAT. § 48.155 (1969).
45. UCCC §§ 2.412 & 3.406.
46. Id., Comments. These sections are very similar to UCC § 9-
318 (3) (1962 Official Text). Although Article 9 only applies to secured
transactions, comments to the UCC admit that the section is largely a
clarification of existing contract principles.
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or lender. In addition, the debtor may request reasonable proof
of the assignment before paying the assignee. By including the
Uniform Commercial Code's notice of assignment provision in
the UCCC, the UCCC re-emphasizes the importance of this gen-
eral principle of contract law in consumer transactions.
2. Notice of Changes in the Terms of Revolving Charge Ac-
counts
Revolving charge and revolving loan accounts are rapidly ex-
panding areas of consumer credit transactions, and have re-
cently been the subject of much criticism and concern.47 The
UCCC contains the following definition of a revolving charge ac-
count:
[A]n arrangement between a seller and a buyer pursuant to
which (1) the seller may permit the buyer to purchase goods or
services on credit either from the seller or pursuant to a seller
credit card, (2) the unpaid balances of amounts financed arising
from purchases and the credit service and other appropriate
charges are debited to an account, (3) a credit service charge if
made is not precomputed but is computed on the outstanding
unpaid balances of the buyer's account from time to time, and(4) the buyer has the privilege of paying the balances in install-
ments.
48
The UCCC, recognizing the fact that such accounts will be
the subject of continued growth,49 attempts to provide the credi-
tor with a feasible method of giving customers reasonable notice
of changes in credit terms. The Code requires that in order to
make a change in credit terms effective as to customer balances
in a revolving account both before and after notice, the creditor
must give the customer written notice at least six months before
the change is to take effect and repeat the notice twice during the
six month period.50 Uniform regulation by the state of this
rapidly expanding area of consumer credit is desirable and the
UCCC's coverage appears to be reasonable and complete.
D. SALES TECHNIQUES
Particular sales techniques used in dealing with consumers
47. See generally Buerger, Revolving Credit and Credit Cards,
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 707 (1968).
48. UCCC § 2.108. Substantially the same definition is used for
revolving loan accounts. UCCC § 3.108.
49. Minnesota's only legislation in this area concerns criminal
liability for unauthorized uses of credit cards. See MINN. STAT. §
325.931 & .932 (1969); 2 CCH CONsuMER CREDIT GUIDE 4640 (1970).
50. UCCC §§ 2.416 & 3.408. Note that general contract limita-
tions also apply. See Buerger, supra note 47, at 715-16.
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have resulted in such obvious abuses that authorities have been
uniformly critical.51 The only question is how the abuses can be
most effectively remedied.
1. Referral Sales
A referral sale involves a purchase of consumer goods or
services at a specified price accompanied by an agreement to re-
duce the balance due or to compensate the buyer for each actual
customer he refers to a seller.52  The abuse lies in the sales
tactics employed" by sellers to represent the usually original, in-
flatd price as manageable, a bargain, and even free after refer-
rals. If used with moderation, for example, by limiting the num-
ber of referrals any one buyer could make, the referral sales tech-
nique could benefit both buyer and seller and not violate rate
and disclosure regulations.53 But sellers have not been moder-
ate, and considering the high profit margin available on referral
sales, change is unlikely.54 Statutory limits on the number of
referrals allowed would not only be almost impossible but also
very impractical since the reasonable maximum may vary ac-
cording to the transaction, the locality and the individual per-
sonality of the buyer. Instead, the UCCC makes referral sales
or lease agreements unenforceable and allows "the buyer or
lessee, at his option, [to] rescind the agreement or retain the
goods delivered and the benefit of any services performed, with-
out any obligation to pay for them."5 5 This is an unusually harsh
remedy but seems justified because of the potential abuses which
result from use of the referral sales technique and from the diffi-
culty of regulation, short of absolute prohibition.56
51. See generally-Jordan & Warren, supra note 4, at 442.
52. Dodge, Referral Sales Contracts: To Alter or Abolish?, 15
BUFFALo L. REv. 669, 673-74 (1966).
53. Id. See also Baird, Let the "Seller" Beware-Another Ap-
proach to the Referral Sales Scheme, 22 U. or MIAMI L. REv. 861; Hogan,
supra note 4.
54. Dodge, supra-note 52, at 672.
55. UCCC § 2.411.
56. UCCC § 2.411, Comment. See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rrv. 387, 442 (1968); Hogan, Inte-
grating the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors' Agreements
and Practices, 33 LAw & CONTaP. PROB. 686, 702 (1968):
Referral transactions are treated so harshly precisely because
they are themselves so harsh and deceptive. Like chain
letters they depend upon people who do not perceive that the
group "of friends and neighbors" needed as new customers will
increase in a geometric progression until the entire population
of the world must buy freezers to satisfy the bonus promises
made to a relatively small number of initial buyers.
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The UCCC's referral sales provision is in effect in Minnesota
as a 1969 amendment to the prevention of consumer fraud section
of Minnesota's statute regulating manufacturing and sales. 7
The result is to prohibit all referral sales in Minnesota and the
statute includes the stringent remedy found in the UCCC.5 s
2. Home Solicitation Sales
Home solicitation sales, like referral sales, have been subject
to much criticism, largely because of the high pressure sales tac-
tics employed.5 9 The UCCC defines home solicitation sales as
.. .a consumer credit sale of goods, other than farm equipment,
or services in which the seller or a person acting for him engages
in a personal solicitation of the sale at a residence of the buyer
and the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is there given to
the seller or a person acting for him.60
The UCCC requires that the buyer be given a three day "cooling-
off period" 61 during which the buyer may cancel by giving or
mailing to the seller a "written notice of cancellation. '0 2 By set-
ting out the required "Buyer's Right to Cancel" clause, the UCCC
also regulates the form of the agreement."" In light of the possi-
bility of nondelivery of a mailed notice of cancellation, the buyer
should be warned that he has the burden of proving that the no-
tice was properly mailed.6 4
If the buyer cancels, the seller is permitted to keep up to
five percent of the cash price as a cancellation fee, provided this
amount does not exceed the cash down payment.05 This provi-
sion illustrates the UCCC's emphasis on balancing the new pro-
tections of the buyer with some protections for the seller. Con-
57. Ch. 1100, 1969, amending MINN. STAT. § 325.79. The only
changes were the deletion of consumer before sale and lease which is
understandable because of the section's title, and credit before sale.
The deletion of credit extends the provision to cash deals.
58. The attorney general's office introduced most of the specific
contract limitations and rate regulations of the UCCC as separate
bills. This appears to be an undesirable approach considering the
value of uniformity and the interrelatedness of the UCCC provisions.
59. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 56; Sher, The "Cooling-Off"
Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 717 (1968).
60. UCCC § 2.501. Prior drafts of the UCCC contained the lan-
guage "at a place other than a place of business of the seller," which
seems to be broader. Jordan & Warren, supra note 56, at 442. The
Code's Comment expresses an intent to avoid limiting the coverage
of this section to sales consummated in the buyer's residence.
61. UCCC § 2.502(1).
62. Id. § 2.502(2).
63. Id. § 2.503 (2).
64. Id. § 2.502, Comment 2.
65. Id. § 2.504(3).
[Vol. 55:544
1971] CREDITORS' PRACTICES AND REMEDIES 555
sidering the potential pressures that a seller can exert on a buyer
in the home solicitation situation, the UCCC's provisions are a
major improvement over the current absence of any significant
restrictions in Minnesota. 6
II. SAFEGUARDING THE CONSUMER
UPON DEFAULT
After the consumer credit agreement has been made, the
creditor-debtor relationship often does not run smoothly. If
the goods or services in a credit sale are defective or otherwise
unsatisfactory, the consumer-debtor may refuse to make future
payments and/or seek a refund. Another possibility is that due
to unforeseen circumstances the debtor may be unable to meet
an installment payment of his consumer credit sale or loan. The
debtor's failure to perform his legal duty operates as a default.
The following sections discuss various practices available to
creditors upon default by the consumer and how Minnesota, the
FCCPA and the UCCC approach the situation.
A. RErE-r-oN OF CoNsumER DEFENSES
In most jurisdictions, consumers are easily deprived of their
defenses against their original creditor through either negotia-
tion of consumer-made notes or waiver of defense clauses in sales
and loan contracts. This loss of defenses has been generally
criticized by commentators 67 and has produced a variety of ju-
dicial interpretations.68
1. Negotiability of Consumer-Made Notes
It is a common practice for the creditor to discount consumer-
66. The FCCPA allows a three day cancellation period only
"... in the case of any consumer credit transaction in which a security
interest is retained or acquired in any real property which is used or is
expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is
extended... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (Supp. V, 1969).
67. See generally Hogan, supra note 56, at 686-91; Jordan &
Warren, supra note 56, at 433-38; King, The Unprotected Consumer-
Maker Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 DicL. L. REv. 207,
209-11 (1961); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 CoLm. L. REv. 445, 469-73 (1968); Littlefield, Preserving
Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44
N.Y.U.L. REnv. 272 (1969); Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
395, 414-18 (1966); Skilton & Heistad, Protection of the Installment
Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MzcH. L. REv.
1465, 1483-85 (1966).
68. Kripke, supra note 67, at 469.
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made notes to financial institutions which usually take as holders
in due course, a position which frees them from most defenses a
consumer-debtor may have against his original creditor.' The
UCC affords holder in due course protection to holders who take
for value, in good faith and without notice.7 0 Traditional com-
mercial practices have been applied to the negotiation of con-
sumer-made paper and the fact that the holder knew he was deal-
ing with consumer-made paper has not been considered lack of
good faith or notice. This implies that to lose his holder in due
course status, the holder would have to have actual knowledge
of the specific defense which the buyer might raise.
Some state courts have recently reacted against the harsh-
ness of the holder in due course doctrine as applied to consumer-
made paper by holding that the financial institution was on no-
tice or lacked good faith.7'1 But the cases are not consistent and
the countervailing policy favoring negotiability has generally
prevailed. To date, there has been no Minnesota decision in-
terpreting the holder in due course issue to favor the consumer.
Consequently, holders in due course are protected when taking
consumer-made negotiable instruments.7 2  In an attempt to
eliminate the source of the problem, the UCCC expressly pro-
hibits the taking of "a negotiable instrument other than a check"
in a consumer credit sale or consumer lease and provides that "a
holder is not in good faith if he takes a negotiable instrument
with notice that it is issued in violation of this section. ' ' 78 The
UCCC Comment interprets this last phrase to cover the pro-
fessional financier who knows he is dealing with consumer-made
69. The defenses retained are listed in UCC § 3-305 (1962 Official
Text).
70. Id. § 3-302. See also Note, supra note 67, at 414. UCC § 1-201
(19) defines good faith as "honesty in fact" which is a subjective stand-
ard. The 1952 draft of the Code further defined good faith with the
statement, "in good faith, including observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged."
This was eliminated in the final 1957 version of the Code which is in
effect in Minnesota. Although the above provision would allow the
consumer to introduce objective facts to show that the financial institu-
tion knew it was dealing with consumer paper, "the difficulty of
showing that there had been a deviation from 'reasonable commercial
standards' made this measure of dubious value." King, supra note 67,
at 209-10.
71. See Note, supra note 67, at 414-16; Littlefield, supra note 67.
72. MINN. STAT. § 336.3-302 (1969) has not been subject to judi-
cial interpretation. See Schauman v. Solmica Midwest, Inc., 283 Minn.
437, 168 N.W.2d 667 (1969), which illustrates that a consumer note is
still an acceptable form of payment.
73. UCCC § 2.403.
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paper.74 In light of the differences in bargaining power and
sophistication of the parties, to distinguish consumer transactions
from commercial transactions is necessary and appropriate.
2. Waiver of Defense Clauses
Waiver of defense clauses provide the second avenue a credi-
tor may take to deprive the consumer of his defenses. The Uni-
form Commercial Code permits waiver of defense clauses "[s]ub-
ject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods .... ,75 To date Minne-
sota has had no decision holding that a different rule exists and
so the impact of the UCC's exception for consumer goods re-
mains an "open question ' 76 and waiver of defense clauses are en-
forced.
The UCCC offers two alternative solutions. Alternative A
completely prohibits waiver of defense clauses77 and is greatly
favored by commentators because the tendency of courts is to en-
force such clauses as part of the bargain.7 8 Alternative B per-
mits waiver of defense clauses under certain circumstances. 79
An enforceable waiver of defense clause requires
... an assignee not related to the seller or lessor who acquires
the buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith and for value, who
gives the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment... and who,
within 3 months after the mailing of the notice of assignment,
receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the buyer's
or lessee's claim or defense.5 0
An additional protection exists in the requirement that only
claims or defenses which have arisen before the end of the three-
month period after notice was mailed are waived.8 '
74. Id., Comment. The Comment suggests that a second or third
taker, unaware of the origin of the note, may qualify as a holder in
due course, but that this would be very unusual. The strong policy
favoring negotiability is being balanced against loss of consumer de-
fenses. See Note, Enforcement Under the UCCC, 55 Mnm. L. RBv. 572,
577 & nn. 23-24 (1971).
75. UCC § 9-206(1) (1962 Official Text).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-206 (1966), Minnesota Code Com-
ment.
77. UCCC § 2.404A. Alternative A was in the UCCC as introduced
in Minnesota.
78. See Kripke, supra note 67, at 470-71; Hogan, supra note 67, at
689-90. "The concern for the buyer in such cases suggests that the en-
actment of alternative B may actually impede the case-by-case develop-
ment of a rule more favorable to the buyer." Id. at 690.
79. UCCC § 2.404B.
80. Id. § 2.404B (1).
81. Id.; see Hogan, supra note 67, at 688-89.
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As with negotiability of consumer-made paper, some courts
have found waiver of defense clauses unenforceable against con-
sumer-debtors by arguing that such clauses are unconscionable,
unfair and contrary to public policy.82 But reliance on the
discretion of the courts is unsatisfactory since it does not provide
the uniformity essential in the area of consumer protection. In
comparison, the UCCC's alternatives provide a comprehensive
and explicit solution for consumer transactions without stretch-
ing the traditional contract principles of the UCC governing com-
mercial transactions. As with negotiable instruments, to distin-
guish between consumer transactions and commercial transac-
tions in the area of waiver of defense clauses seems appropriate
considering the differences in bargaining power and sophistica-
tion of the parties.
But a possible loophole exists in the UCCC because neither
the waiver of defense provision nor the prohibition of consumer-
made notes provision is found in the article dealing with con-
sumer loans.83 Thus, in a consumer credit sale, a dealer may en-
ter an agreement with a finance company in order to have two
transactions involved in every consumer credit sale: first, a sale
by the retail seller and second, an installment loan by the financ-
ing agent. One commentator believes that this loophole must be
eliminated before consumer defenses can be adequately pre-
served.8 4
Other commentators have supported the UCCC's different
treatment of consumer sales and consumer loans in the negotia-
bility and waiver of defense provisions. One argument is that
the relationship of the financial institution to the buyer and the
seller in the case of assignment of consumer paper is different
than the relationship between the parties in making a consumer
loan.s 5 Another argument is that "[ilt is hard to believe that
the industry will sacrifice the assurance of a regular flow of busi-
ness from the seller to the sales financer to protect itself from the
risk of claims or defenses arising in favor of the buyer."8 0 Fi-
82. Littlefield, supra note 67, at 278; see also Murray, The Con-
sumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAm L. REv.
11, 66-67 (1968).
83. No provision in Article 3 corresponds with UCCC §§ 2.404A& B.
84. Littlefield, supra note 67, at 292. The author proposes an
amendment to the UCCC. Id. at 293-94.
85. Jordan & Warren, supra note 56, at 437-38. The recent inno-
vation of bank credit cards may destroy the validity of this distinction.
86. Hogan, supra note 56, at 690.
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nally, courts should be able to strike down such devices if they
would arise.
3. Result
The opponents of the UCCC's limitations on waiver of de-
fense clauses and the negotiability of consumer-made notes claim
that these provisions will hinder the normal flow of business and
tighten available credit.8 7 The contrary view is that considering
the size and continued growth of the consumer credit industry, it
is unlikely that limitations like those in the UCCC would have
a major adverse impact. In the opinion of one commentator, al-
though the cost of credit will probably increase, the product will
be better."8 Another argument in favor of imposing these two
limitations on creditors is that such freedom from customer de-
fenses has never characterized the commercial world where bar-
gaining power is more equal. The financier in normal commer-
cial transactions assumes a policing role and refuses to do busi-
ness with a merchant who has a history of customer complaints
and returned goods.8 9 These factors lead to the conclusion that
a reputable merchant would have no problem assigning his con-
sumer accounts. The UCCC's provisions protecting consumer de-
fenses would place the financial institution in this type of policing
role in the consumer credit area.90
B. PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER'S PRoPEmTY
1. The Extent of Security Rights Allowed
The UCCC has limited the seller's and lessor's right to se-
curity in consumer sales, depending upon the manner in which
the obligation arose. In a sale of goods, a security interest may be
taken in the goods sold, but not in other goods unless they be-
come closely connected with the goods sold.0 ' For example, the
mechanic who puts a new engine into the consumer's car would
probably be able to take a security interest in the whole car. To
take a security interest in other goods, the transaction must, how-
ever, meet the additional requirement that the debt secured be
substantial. The Code defines "substantial" as $300 for a security
interest in goods and $1,000 for a security interest in land.92
87. Littlefield, supra note 67, at 286.
88. Id.
89. Kripke, supra note 67, at 472.
90. Jordan & Warren, supra note 56, at 436.
91. UCCC § 2.407(1) & Comment 1.
92. Id.
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When the sale is for services, the security interest may be taken
only in land or goods maintained or improved by such services.
Again there is a $300 and $1,000 substantial debt requirement.9
A sale of land gives rise to a security interest only in the land
sold and is treated as a consumer credit sale only if the credit
service charge exceeds ten percent.9 4 This summary illustrates
that where the seller may obtain a security interest in goods
beyond the goods sold, the relation of the additional goods to the
origin of the debt is the important factor.
2. Limitations on Use of Cross-Collateral
In addition to limiting the property in which the creditor
may take a security interest, the UCCC also seeks to limit the
use of cross-collateral, another form of additional collateral.9
Where there have been previous sales by the seller to the buyer,
the seller may take a security interest in goods from prior sales
in which he has an existing security interest. Also, a contract
may be made allowing the seller to take a security interest in
goods he sells to the buyer in the future. 6 The UCCC correlates
the use of cross-collateral to rate regulation by stating that the
rate of credit service charge "may not exceed that permitted if
the balances so secured were consolidated . . . -17 This prevents
the creditor from using cross-collateral agreements in order to
avoid rate regulation." Finally, payments on debts collaterally
secured are specifically allocated to the earliest purchase first un-
93. Id. § 2.407(1) & Comment 2.
94. Id. § 2.407(1) & Comment 3. In addition the UCCC prohibits
a lessor from taking a security interest in the property of a lessee.
UCCC § 2.407(2) & Comment 4. In a sale for agricultural purposes, the
seller is allowed to take a security interest in other property. UCCC
§ 2.407(1) & Comment 5. Security interests in loans are unrestricted
except for UCCC § 3.510(1) which prohibits taking a security interest
in land when the loan is for $1,000 or less.
95. UCCC § 2.408.
96. Id. § 2.408(1).
97. Id. § 2.408(2).
98. Id., Comment 2 uses this illustration:
If a buyer who owes a seller a $275 balance from one sale
makes a subsequent $250 purchase, the seller may consolidate
these debts under Section 2.206(1) so that the credit service
charge would be calculated on the sum of the refinanced bal-
ance of the first sale, e.g., $260, and the amount financed un-
der the second sale, $250, or a total of $510. Under section 2 201
the seller may then charge a maximum rate of 36% on the first$300 and 21% on the next $210. However, if the debts were
kept separate, the seller might charge the maximum of 36% on
both the $275 and $250 balances.
See also Hogan, supra note 56, at 698-99.
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til it is completely paid, or, if sales are made on the same day, to
the smallest first.9 9 This prevents the seller from repossessing
all items when one payment is missed.1 00
3. The UCC and Minnesota
Article 9 of the UCC represents essentially all of Minnesota's
law governing security interests.10 1 The policies underlying Ar-
ticle 9 have been summarized by one commentator as follows:
1. To remove technicalities.
2. To make personal property security transactions simple, safe
and inexpensive.
3. To eliminate any differences of substance based on form.
4. On default, to realize the value of the security by sale or
other disposition by the secured party himself with as little
recourse to legal process or to court procedure as possible.102
These policies indicate the need in commercial transactions to
find a solution quickly and easily, but not necessarily fairly.
The UCC, recognizing that consumer transactions may involve
different policies, contains many disclaimers of intent to replace
state consumer credit legislation.1 0 3 The Minnesota legislature
99. UCCC § 2.409 (1) & (3) apply to credit sales. These same regu-
lations apply to payments made on a revolving charge account where
various security interests exist. UCCC § 2.409 (2).
100. The facts of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), dramatically illustrate the problems. In the
Williams case a furniture.dealer sold a stereo set for $514.95 on credit
to a woman who was receiving welfare payments of $218 per month for
herself ahd seven children. The dealer had knowledge of the con-
sumer's financial status. The consumer owed the dealer $164 as the
balance of her prior purchases when she bought the stereo, and she had
made purchases totaling $1,800 over the years from this dealer. The
security agreement under which she bought the stereo provided that
her payments would be prorated over the purchase price of the stereo
and over all other purchases made by her. Each new purchase auto-
matically became subject to a security interest arising out of her pre-
vious purchases, and upon default in her payments, the dealer had the
right to repossess all of the goods purchased. The consumer defaulted
and the dealer sought to replevy all of her purchases.
101. NiN . STAT. § 336.9 (1969).
102. Richter, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Roundup,
7 PEas. FiN. Q. 36 (1953).
103: Hogan, supra note 56, at 693. The following sections of the
UCC contain special reference to consumer goods or sales: 9-109(1),
9-203(1), 9-204(4) (b), 9-206(1), 9-307(2), 9-401(1) (a), 9-505(1) and 9-
507 (1). Also the comment to 9-101 states:
Consumer installment sales and consumer loans present special
problems of a nature which makes special regulation of them
inappropriate in a general commercial codification. Many
states now regulate such loans and sales.... While this
article applies generally to security interests in consumer
goods, it is not designed to supercede such regulatory legislation.
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has not yet acted to limit creditors' rights in secured consumer
transactions and Minnesota courts continue to apply general
contract law to consumer transactions.1 0 4
Examination of the UCC's approach to consumer transac-
tions in relation to both consumer defenses and secured transac-
tions illustrates the great inadequacies of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code as a source of consumer protection. Even so, one au-
thor does believe that the UCC, if flexibly used by the courts,
makes the adoption of separate consumer legislation unneces-
sary. 0 5 Some courts have taken the initiative by exercising
broad discretion-with great emphasis on unconscionability-to
protect the consumer. This judicial protection, however, is nei-
ther reliable nor evident in Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.
Enactment of comprehensive consumer protection legislation
would make judicial gymnastics unnecessary and would preserve
the UCC's policies in commercial transactions where they are
appropriate.
C. PRESERVING THE CONSUMER'S WAGES
Determination of the extent to which a consumer's wages
should be preserved involves a balancing of many policies. On
one hand, preservation of an individual's right to his future
wages is premised upon the rationale that people need a certain
amount of income in order to survive and are motivated to work
when assured of actually receiving what they earn.' °  On the
other hand, the consumer credit industry, even in middle-class
contexts, strongly relies on the proposition that the buyer will
pay for a present benefit from his future income. 0 7 In addition,
it is argued that the individual has the right to dispose of his
property and earnings as he sees fit since freedom of contract is
a basic premise of our contract law. Until recently, the latter,
traditional arguments have prevailed.
1. Assignment of Earnings
The UCCC strictly limits assignment of earnings. In con-
sumer credit sales, leases and loans, irrevocable assignments of
earnings are unenforceable by the assignee and revocable by the
104. See, e.g., Ruona v. Freeway Dodge, 285 Minn. 23, 171 N.W.2d
212 (1969).
105. Murray, supra note 82, at 70.
106. Hogan, supra note 56, at 695-96.
107. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U.. REv. 1, 28 (1969).
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buyer, lessee or debtor. 0 8 Thus, the debtor is given an oppor-
tunity to have his debt determined by a court before any credi-
tors can reach his earnings against his will.'09
Minnesota permits irrevocable assignments of wages if cer-
tain procedures are complied with. Written notice and a copy of
the assignment must be given to the employer within three days
of the assignment and the employer then consents in writing.'1 0
A further limitation provides that a wage assignment is void if
due in whole or part more than 60 days after making the con-
tract."' In addition to the above restrictions, Minnesota's small
loan statute invalidates wage assignments "unless the amount of
the loan is paid to the borrower simultaneously with [the as-
signment's] execution,"" 2 and limits the amount to "ten per cent
of the borrower's salary, wages, commissions, or other compen-
sation."' 13
Both the UCCC and Minnesota recognize that the freedom
of contract theory is inappropriate in consumer credit transac-
tions since the contracting parties are in unequal bargaining po-
sitions." 4  Minnesota's approach illustrates a compromise be-
tween complete preservation of the consumer's wages and the in-
dividual's right to dispose of his property. When an irrevocable
assignment of earnings has been made, the Minnesota consumer
still has the burden of initiating litigation if he has a defense
against the creditor. For the unsophisticated and poor consumer
such action is usually unfeasible and/or impractical and the
UCCC would afford greater protection.
2. Garnishment
The criticisms and abuses involved in separating the con-
sumer from his future wages are even more apparent in wage
garnishment. 115 For example, the recent increase in the number
108. UCCC §§ 2.410 & 3.403.
109. Id. § 2.410, Comment. It is implied that the creditor must take
the initiative in any litigation to establish the debt.
110. M n-. STAT. §§ 181.04 & .05 (1969). The UCCC's use of "earn-
ings" rather than wages may make it broader.
111. MNN. STAT. § 181.06 (1969).
112. MrN . STAT. § 56.17 (1969).
113. Id.
114. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text; Spanogle, Analyz-
ing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 933 (1969).
115. Garnishment is a statutory collection device whereby a debtor's
assets in the hands of a third party are subjected to a judgment or
potential judgment against the debtor. Note, Federal Restrictions of
Wage Garnishments: Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
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of consumer bankruptcies has been largely attributed to wage
garnishment." 6 Although authorities tend to agree that wage
garnishment often operates unfairly on the consumer, there is
little agreement as to possible remedies and solutions. 117
The FCCPA limits the maximum amount available to credi-
tors and restricts discharge for garnishment." 8 Minnesota ex-
tensively amended its garnishment statute in 1969"1 to include
essentially the same language as the FCCPA except that the
amount exempted from garnishment is increased to the greater
of 75 percent or 40 times the minimum wage 20 rather than the
greater of 75 percent or 30 times the minimum wage as in the
FCCPA.121
One recurring problem has been that the employer, unwill-
ing to become involved in the garnishment process, discharges
the employee when the latter's wages are garnished. The FCCPA
offered a solution by providing that "[n] o employer may dis-
charge an employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have
been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness."'122
The Federal Act further provides for a fine and/or imprisonment
for any such unwarranted discharge of garnished employees.' 23
Minnesota enacted a stricter provision which prohibits discharge
for garnishment "unless there have been more than three garn-
ishments within a 90 day period involving more than one in-
debtedness."'124 Minnesota also eliminates the criminal penalty,
instead allowing the debtor a civil action to recover twice the
wages lost plus reinstatement. 125 The UCCC prohibits any dis-
charge "for the reason that a creditor of the employee has sub-
44 IND. L.J. 267 (1969); Comment, Garnishment Action Without Notice
and Hearing is Denial of Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 853 (1970).
116. See generally Kripke, supra note 107, at 29-32; McLean, The
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199, 202-05 (1968).
117. Hogan, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 159,
161 (1969). See text accompanying notes 134-38 infra for a discussion
of the UCCC's treatment of garnishment before judgment.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-76 (Supp. IV, 1969). See Note, Garnishment
Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 38 U. CiN. L. REV. 338 (1969).
119. Laws 1969, Chapter 1142. See Comment, supra note 115.
120. MINN. STAT. § 550.37(13) (1969). These maximums are the
same as those in UCCC § 5.105. MINN. STAT. § 550.37(1) (1969)
goes further to completely exempt certain property from garnishment.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV, 1969).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
124. MINN. STAT. § 571.61(1) (1969).
125. MINN. STAT. § 571.61(2) (1969).
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jected or attempted to subject unpaid earnings of the employee
to garnishment . "..."120
The UCCC, as proposed to the Minnesota Legislature in
1969,127 left Minnesota's garnishment statute dealing with dis-
missal unaffected, so both would apply if the UCCC were
adopted.128  This dispenses with the criticism that the UCCC
would only apply to consumer credit transactions, but it also may
pose a problem in how the number of indebtednesses will be
counted when both consumer based garnishments and non-con-
sumer based garnishments are being executed against a single
debtor. In order to discharge the employee under the Minne-
sota statute, at least four garnishments would be required and
they would have to originate from non-consumer credit trans-
actions.
Since Minnesota's garnishment provisions would appear to
qualify as "substantially similar"1 29 to the FCCPA provision,
the qualification of the state statutory scheme plus the UCCC
would be no problem and the state, therefore, would be exempt
from federal regulation. The passage of the amendments to the
Minnesota garnishment statute raises doubts as to the necessity
of adopting the UCCC's provisions, particularly since further
protection for consumers could be accomplished through addi-
tional amendments to the existing law. Favoring the UCCC pro-
visions would be the correlation of the UCCC's protection of the
consumer's wages to the other protections the UCCC provides.
Uniformity may be lost by cutting parts out of the UCCC and
adopting separate though similar provisions.
An alternative remedy to the abuses created by garnishment
would be the elimination of the garnishment process entirely.
In support of this solution it is argued that states which have
abolished wage garnishment have not experienced a decrease in
the amount of consumer credit available.1 30  On the other hand,
126. UCCC § 5.106.
127. J. of the House 10-105, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day), lists
which sections of Minnesota statutes would be repealed or amended by
adoption of the UCCC.
128. UCCC § 1.103.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (Supp. V, 1970):
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt from
the provisions of section 1673 (a) of this title garnishments is-
sued under the laws of any State if he determines that the laws
of that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are
substantially similar to those provided in section 1673 (a) of this
title.
130. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Rec-
ommendations, 53 CALi. L. Bu-y. 1214, 1234-38 (1965).
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one author strongly criticizes this reasoning and states that "garn-
ishments do result in collection.' 1 3 ' Most authors have rejected
complete elimination of garnishment. It is the poor who would
be most harshly affected by denial of credit but there are no con-
clusive figures to predict the exact result.13 2 A denial of credit
to the poor may have very little impact on a statistical analysis
of the consumer credit industry.
The most feasible alternative to complete abolition of garn-
ishment is statutory limitation, and combining the new Minnesota
statute with the UCCC provisions seems to eliminate most of the
problems in wage garnishment. 33
D. THE CONSUmER'S DAY IN COURT
A problem mentioned in relation to the preservation of con-
sumer defenses, consumer property and consumer wages was the
consumer's right to a judicial determination of the existence and
the extent of his debt. Following is a discussion of other creditor
practices commonly used to deprive the consumer of his day in
court and of the protections offered by the relevant statutes.
1. Garnishment before Judgment
Another UCCC provision dealing with garnishment prohibits
attachment of the debtor's unpaid earnings before judgment has
been entered.13 4  Prejudgment garnishment has been severely
criticized because, in order to contest the validity of the debt,
the consumer is forced to initiate suit which is often too expen-
sive or time-consuming. 35 The recent Supreme Court decision
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.1 36 took a harsh view of pre-
judgment garnishment even though most state garnishment stat-
utes permit the procedure. 37 In 1969, Minnesota responded to
131. Kripke, supra note 107, at 31. Kripke criticizes Brunn, supra
note 130, because "his conclusion necessarily follows from his question-
begging assumptions." See Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-
An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 772 n. 160 (1968).
132. See Note, supra note 131.
133. See generally Note, supra note 118. An additional provision in
the UCCC prohibits garnishment before judgment and thus dispenses
with the constitutional issue raised in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See text accompanying notes 134-38
infra.
134. UCCC § 5.104.
135. See Note, Enforcement Under the UCCC, 55 MINN. L. REV. 572(1971), for additional problems of consumer litigation.
136. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
137. Comment, supra note 115, at 856.
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Sniadach and eliminated prejudgment garnishment except in
a few unusual situations.138  Considering the burden of litiga-
tion and the other abuses inherent in garnishment before judg-
ment, the UCCC's complete prohibition appears desirable.
2. Confession of Judgment
A confession of judgment clause in an agreement authorizes
the creditor or his nominee to obtain judgment against the
debtor upon future default, usually without service of process
or notice to the debtor. In light of the contracts of adhesion
common in consumer credit transactions and the expense, time
and uncertainty of litigation, these clauses are a source of
great hardship for the unsuspecting consumer-debtor. 3 9
The problem often arises when a confession of judgment
clause is attached to a consumer-made note. The UCC, as effec-
tive in Iinnesota, provides that unless otherwise illegal,' 40
"[t] he negotiability of an instrument is not affected by ... (d)
a term authorizing a confession of judgment on the instrument if
it is not paid when due. .... ,,141 Since Minnesota has no stat-
ute prohibiting confession of judgment clauses on consumer-
made notes, courts continue to uphold them so long as a separate
138. Mrnw. STAT. § 571.41(2) & (3) (1969):
Subd. 2. Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in the
following instances only:
(1) For the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction(a) when the defendant is a resident individual having de-
parted from the state with intent to defraud his creditors
or to avoid service or keeps himself concealed with like
intent; or(b) the defendant is a resident individual who has de-
parted from the state, or cannot be found therein; or
(c) the defendant is a nonresident individual, or a for-
eign corporation, partnership or association.(2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a con-
tract of suretyship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which
the garnishee may be held to respond to any person for the
claim asserted against the debtor in the main action.
Subd. 3. In the instances where garnishment is permitted before
the entry of judgment the parties for the purposes of this act
will be known as judgment debtor or judgment creditor re-
spectively.
The FCCPA contains no mention of prejudgment garnishment. Gar-
nishment is simply defined as ".... any legal or equitable pro-
cedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be
withheld for payment of any debt" 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
Thus, where the state's legal or equitable procedure allowed garnishment
before judgment, the FCCPA would not interfere.
139. See King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the UCC,
65 DIcK. L. REv. 207, 208 (1961).
140. UCC § 3-112(2) (1962 Official Text).
141. Id. § 3-112(1) (d).
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statement signed by the defendant authorizing confession of
judgment is filed and procedural requirements are met.142  In
Minnesota's Motor Vehicle Act and Small Loans Act, confessions
of judgment are specifically made unenforceable, 1 4 3 but these
cover only two areas of consumer transactions. All confessions
of judgment are invalid under the UCCC. 4 4 Thus, the creditor
cannot use this procedure to place the burden of initiating litiga-
tion on the debtor, or to avoid the rights and defenses of the
debtor which are explicitly protected in other provisions of the
UCCC. The UCCC also invalidates clauses by which the debtor
consents to the application of the law of another state, the juris-
diction of another state's courts or the fixing of venue. 14 5 Com-
bined with the prohibition of garnishment before judgment, these
UCCC provisions return to the consumer his rights of notice and
due process.
3. Restrictions on Deficiency Judgments
Under the usual procedures of the Uniform Commercial
Code, upon default in a secured credit transaction, the creditor
has the right to take possession, without court approval of the
goods secured or of other goods in which he may have a security
interest.146 The creditor may then sell the collateral after giv-
ing the debtor reasonable notice, 47 and the debtor remains per-
sonally liable for any deficiency.1 4  Considering the rapid de-
preciation and over-pricing 149 of consumer goods, the emphasis on
price is much less valid in consumer sales than in commercial
142. MNN. STAT. § 548.22 (1969) and Minnesota Comments to the
UCC.
143. MINN. STAT. § 168.71 (a) (2) (1969): "No provisions for confes-
sion of judgment or power of attorney therefor contained in any retail
installment contract or contained in a separate agreement relating
thereto, shall be valid or enforceable." MINN. STAT. § 56.12 (1969),
reads: "No licensee shall take any confession of judgment or any power
of attorney."
144. UCCC §§ 2.415 & 3.407.
145. UCCC § 1.201(1).
146. UCC § 9-503 (1962 Official Text).
147. Id. § 9-504(1) & (3) and Comment.
148. Id. § 9-505. As stated in the Comment, "In the case of con-
sumer goods where 60% of the price or obligation has been paid the
disposition must be made within 90 days after possession taken." See
generally Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 387, 440-41 (1968).
149. See also Jones, The Role of National Companies: Ghetto De-
velopment, Redress of Denied Opportunities, Growth and Profit Max-
imization or Black Capital, 25 Bus. LAW. 146-51 (1969); Hogan, Integrat-
ing the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors' Agreements
and Practices, 33 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 686, 694 (1968).
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transactions between merchants. Also, added to the inequality of
bargaining, contracts of adhesion and other creditor practices
and remedies discussed so far, the burden on the consumer is in-
deed heavy. 50
Minnesota has not yet attempted to provide special treat-
ment for consumer credit transactions and so the UCC with its
many inadequacies still controls. Upon default in a secured con-
sumer credit sale of $1,000 or less,15' the UCCC restricts the credi-
tor either to repossession of the secured property or to a personal
judgment against the debtor for the balance due.152 Because the
UCCC does not require the creditor to resell if he elects to retake
the collateral, 53 the UCCC should be amended to provide a no-
tice procedure whereby the consumer is notified of the creditor's
intent to retake so payment of the balance due can be arranged.15 4
Considering the effect that limiting deficiency judgments
may have on pricing, one commentator takes the position that the
UCCC approach
should force the seller to assure himself that he will be able to
recapture the balance owed from the goods themselves. This
will make for a more realistic relationship between the rate of
depreciation of the goods and the schedule of payments.155
Conversely, it is argued that such a limitation will "boomer-
ang," frightening the responsible creditors, causing higher credit
charges and refusal of credit to marginal debtors. The marginal
debtors will be forced to resort to illegitimate creditors.'15 Also,
where the goods were overpriced or are of slight resale value, the
creditor can still go against the debtor personally for the whole
amount, so denial of the creditor's rights against the collateral
may be useless.15 7
150. Hogan, supra note 117, at 162. 'Perhaps the most significant
protection for the debtor is the limitation on a sales creditor's rights to
obtain a deficiency judgment. It is this lingering liability for the
price of goods sold even after they have been repossessed that has often
led to garnishment of wages among the poor."
151. The UCCC as proposed in Minnesota increased the maximum
price of sales covered from the UCCC's $1,000 to $5,000. J. of the House
10-105, Tuesday, May 13, 1969 (91st day).
152. UCCC § 5.103. Section 1.103 states that the UCCC controls
where there is conflict with the UCC.
153. UCCC § 5.103(2). This section is contrary to the 60 percent
limitation of UCC § 9-505.
154. Hogan, supra note 149, at 693-94.
155. Hogan, supra note 117, at 162; Hogan, supra note 149, at 694.
156. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLum L. REv. 445, 469-73 (1968).
157. Id. at 477.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. THE USE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
Special treatment of consumer contracts, absent special legis-
lation, has often been tied to the unconscionable clause of the
UCC. Proponents of the UCCC or other consumer oriented legis-
lation are critical of the unreliability and unpredictability of this
approach. On the other hand, a "minority of one" 158 takes the
position that
[t]he relatively small number of consumer cases arising under
the unconscionability rule of the Code have been favorable to
the consumer, indicating that the courts have not had as much
trouble with the Code as have the academic critics. It is be-
lieved that the unconscionability and good faith rules of the Code
are sufficiently broad to enable the courts to police oppressive
sales and credit sales to consumers. We ought to give the Code
a sufficient trial period before we decide that it does not protect
the consumer.15 9
But the UCC and traditional contract practices purport to
establish rules governing commercial transactions. To stretch
these concepts from the commercial field into the consumer credit
area may be undesirable. Also, to rely heavily on the courts to
protect consumers may adversely affect the uniformity of UCC
application. 160 In addition, the UCCC also contains an uncon-
scionable clause' 61 almost identical to that of the UCC. Some
of the criticisms mentioned above are avoided by an additional
section in the UCCC which lists three situations in which an
injunction may be obtained against unconscionable conduct and
five factors that must be considered. 16 2
B. UNIFORVITY
Largely because of the existing varieties in state law, not
only among, but also within most individual states, there is no
valid consumer folklore, or instinctive understanding, of what
one's rights, benefits and problems are in obtaining credit. In
large measure this is also true of the small businessman. What-
ever general understanding exists is largely inaccurate.168
This Note has presented an overview of the variety of contract
158. Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional
View, 23 U. OF MIAMI L. REv. 11, 70-71 (1968).
159. Id.
160. See text accompanying note 102 supra. See also Spanogle,
Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 935 (1969).
161. UCCC § 5.108.
162. Id. § 6.111. See Note, supra note 135, at 595-96 & nn. 135-43.
163. Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uninformed and Unitary Laws Regulating
Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 209, 223 (1968).
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provisions and creditor remedies presently available as an il-
lustration of the superior legal position occupied by creditors
when dealing with consumers. In light of the lack of progress
and the piecemeal approach to consumer protection legislation in
Minnesota, a uniform and comprehensive statute like the UCCC
appears to be the most appropriate and beneficial form of action
at this time. "As uniformity develops, we may expect both the
ordinary consumer and his legal representatives to increase their
understanding of this area of the law."16 4 Legislation is needed
and the UCCC is the best solution proposed thus far.
164 Id.
